I get it: moral relativism is self-refuting, because it makes a moral case itself: thou shalt not be a moralist. But this kind of argument is the stuff of spergy abstractionism, and therefore not very convincing, a tad unappetizing even. A somewhat better way of looking at it is similar to the infinite regress of utilitarianism: if you make the case that there is no valid moral imperative, and it all simply comes down to the will to power, the law of the jungle, survival, fitness, or [insert latest fad], then you are still left wondering why the hell you should obey the law of the jungle, or survive, or maximize fitness, or generally faddify your life and that of others.
Interesting that both of our minds seem to be fixed on "the source" this week; that spot far upriver that we can't fully see but notice evidence of everywhere. It will make more sense when i post, but i think we're caught up in the same strange current (yet again).
What ist even more conteafictory than moral relativism, are often Moral relativists themselves.
If you indeed believe in moral relativism, than why would you convince others of it? A true will-to-power-might-makes-right type would just do and take what he wants, without having or even espousing any ideology. Yet no one talks as much about their ideology and how pure action is superior to "mere" thought or speech, than those edgy nitzschean types. This makes them just as hypocritical as the supposed "slave morality" about which they complain so much (despite it just beating them at their own game).
There can only be two explanations for this: Those who preach moral relativism and social darwinism in this way, must be either profoundly confused or manipulative hypocrites, who just want to demoralize peoples to erode their Power against them.
Possibly the greatest insight I picked up from my time studying virtue ethics and the history of moral ideas is this:
There is a difference between moral rules and moral ends, which are idealizations, and the use of practical reason to decide what's best to do in any particular occasion.
It's entirely possible to *act badly* when acting on a moral consideration. That doesn't mean the moral rule/end is false or bad, or that it's all relative to like, your opinion, man. It means that the moral agents reasoned or acted badly given the balance of reasons for (not) acting.
Ancient and medieval writers on ethics knew this. We've lost it in the carnage of modern, secular moral thought. Goofy doctrines like utilitarianism cannot make this distinction.
Interesting that both of our minds seem to be fixed on "the source" this week; that spot far upriver that we can't fully see but notice evidence of everywhere. It will make more sense when i post, but i think we're caught up in the same strange current (yet again).
Very well done.
A fine piece indeed. To add my own two Cents:
What ist even more conteafictory than moral relativism, are often Moral relativists themselves.
If you indeed believe in moral relativism, than why would you convince others of it? A true will-to-power-might-makes-right type would just do and take what he wants, without having or even espousing any ideology. Yet no one talks as much about their ideology and how pure action is superior to "mere" thought or speech, than those edgy nitzschean types. This makes them just as hypocritical as the supposed "slave morality" about which they complain so much (despite it just beating them at their own game).
There can only be two explanations for this: Those who preach moral relativism and social darwinism in this way, must be either profoundly confused or manipulative hypocrites, who just want to demoralize peoples to erode their Power against them.
Possibly the greatest insight I picked up from my time studying virtue ethics and the history of moral ideas is this:
There is a difference between moral rules and moral ends, which are idealizations, and the use of practical reason to decide what's best to do in any particular occasion.
It's entirely possible to *act badly* when acting on a moral consideration. That doesn't mean the moral rule/end is false or bad, or that it's all relative to like, your opinion, man. It means that the moral agents reasoned or acted badly given the balance of reasons for (not) acting.
Ancient and medieval writers on ethics knew this. We've lost it in the carnage of modern, secular moral thought. Goofy doctrines like utilitarianism cannot make this distinction.